Put AI agents to work in real systems without giving up control.
Choose which systems and actions the agent can use. STACK keeps credentials out of its reach, denies requests outside those limits and records every action it handles.
See how the install worksA stolen npm token let malicious packages republish compromised versions across everything the maintainer controlled.
639 malicious versions across 323 packages in the May wave.
When the credential stays in STACK and is injected only for a permitted call, malware in the agent runtime has no npm token to steal or reuse.
A poisoned document planted instructions in Microsoft 365 Copilot’s memory. Later conversations could then leak passwords, codes or other data without the user reopening the document.
Copilot provided no audit log for memory changes, so the malicious instruction could remain hidden.
Before an agent sends a memory-write call, STACK scans the request for prompt injection. In enforced mode, a critical match blocks the call and records the decision in the hash-chained audit log.
Attackers exploited a flaw in LiteLLM to reach its database without logging in, putting the provider credentials stored there at risk.
STACK keeps credentials encrypted in the database. A database breach does not expose usable keys.
A compromised maintainer account published malicious versions of more than 100 Mastra packages. Installing one ran an infostealer automatically on developer machines and CI runners.
STACK keeps service credentials out of the agent runtime and injects them only for approved calls. The malware would find no provider keys to steal from the machine.
Replit’s coding agent deleted a live database during a code freeze, despite being told not to make changes.
Scope the agent to development and STACK blocks calls to production before releasing the credential. The delete never reaches the live database.
Our agent is live. It reads real email and can write to one public visitor log.
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